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Banks’ equity stakes in borrowing firms:
A corporate finance approach




In most countries, banks’ equity holdings in firms that borrow from then are rather
small. In light of the theoretical literature, this is somewhat surprising. For
example, according to agency cost models, allowing banks to hold equity would
seem to alleviate firms’ asset substitution moral hazard problem associated with
debt financing. This idea is formalised in John, John, and Saunders in a model
where banks are modeled as passive investors and bank loans are the only source
of outside finance for firms. In this paper, we argue that this alleged benefit of
banks’ equity holding is small or non-existent when banks are modeled explicitly
as active monitors and firms have access also to market finance.
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Pankkien osakesijoitukset luotottamiinsa yrityksiin:
Yritysrahoitusteoreettinen näkökulma




Pankkien osakesijoitukset luotottamiinsa yrityksiin ovat useimmissa maissa varsin
pieniä. Teoreettisen kirjallisuuden valossa tämä on hiukan yllättävää. Esimerkiksi
agentuurikustannusmallien perusteella pankkien osakesijoitukset luotottamiinsa
yrityksiin näyttäisivät lievittävän velkarahoitukseen liittyvää yritysten moraali-
kato-ongelmaa. John, John ja Saunders ovat formalisoineet tämän idean mallissa,
jossa pankit ovat passiivisia investoijia ja yritysten ainoa ulkoisen rahoituksen
lähde. Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että pankkien osakeomistusten mahdolli-
nen hyöty on pieni tai olematon, kun pankit mallinnetaan yritysten monitoroijiksi
ja kun yritykset pystyvät hankkimaan rahoitusta suoraan rahoitusmarkkinoilta.
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A well-known agency cost of debt, identified, for example, by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), is that debt-financed entrepreneurs may benefit from investing
in suboptimal projects. As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), this ‘asset
substitution’ effect may be alleviated by financing the firm with equity. It is
natural to think that banks, as creditors, are also faced with this asset substitution
problem, and that bank’s holding of equity in the borrowing firm may improve the
efficiency of the entrepreneur’s project choice.
This simple idea is modeled by John et al (1994). They examine the firm’s
risk choice in a model, where the chosen riskiness of the firm’s investment project
is the entrepreneur’s private information and where banks are the only source of
outside finance. Banks finance firms with debt and/or equity, which are
characterised merely as claims to the cash flows of the project. In this simple
framework, John et al (1994), find, not surprisingly, that allowing banks to invest
in equity reduces the risk-taking incentives of firms.
At first glance, the idea of John et al (1994) is persuasive. However, in this
paper, we argue that the benefits of banks’ equity holdings may be small or even
non-existent when two realistic complications are introduced to the framework of
John et al (1994). First, we explicitly model banks as monitors. In John et al
(1994), banks can reduce the asset substitution problem only by financing firms
an appropriate mix of debt and equity claims. In other words, they treat the bank
merely as a passive substitute for the firm’s capital structure. In contrast to them,
we assume that banks can employ a costly (interim) monitoring technology to
reduce the asset substitution moral hazard problem. Second, we assume that, in
addition to (informed) bank finance, firms have access to (uninformed) market
finance. As far as we know and as pointed out by Santos (1999, p. 1111), there are
no other studies investigating banks’ equity holdings in borrowing firms when
firms have access to market finance.
Our critique on John et al (1994) is close to the critique of Gorton and Winton
(2002) directed towards some other models of banks’ equity holdings, such as
Berlin et al (1996) and Mahrt-Smith (2000). In their models, as argued by Gorton
and Winton (2002, p. 44), subordinating the bank’s loans accomplishes the same
ends as having the bank hold equity. We, in turn, show that the monitoring by the
bank and the firm’s access to the market finance may accomplish the same ends as
having the bank hold equity. Our critique may also be seen as a theoretical
support to the well-known empirical observation that banks’ equity holdings are
rather small in most countries.
We consider the following model. Entrepreneurs are characterised by their
initial wealth w, 0  w < 1. They need 1 – w units of funds from outside financiers
to carry out a unit-sized investment project at date 0. The entrepreneur can invest8
either in a socially efficient safe project or in a socially inefficient risky project at
date 1. This assumption together with the assumption that the entrepreneur is
wealth-constrained implies that there is the standard asset substitution problem
between the entrepreneur and debtholders. The role of equity is to ameliorate this
asset substitution problem. In order for debt to have a special role, we introduce
an additional moral hazard problem to the framework of John et al (1994).
Following Boyd et al (1997) and La Porta et al (2002), and to be discussed below,
we assume that the entrepreneur can ‘divert’ or ‘steal’ the invested funds (‘take
the money and run’), albeit with a cost.
1 An important assumption of our model is
that the entrepreneur’s cost of diverting the funds raised by debt is higher than the
cost of diverting the funds raised by equity. This assumption allows us to build a
model, in which both debt and equity have distinct roles to play. Equity is superior
to debt in alleviating the asset substitution moral hazard problem, and debt is
superior to equity in reducing the diversion moral hazard problem.
There are two types of outside financiers: banks and uninformed financiers,
such as small shareholders and bondholders. Uninformed financiers do not
observe the project choice at any cost. The bank, in turn, can commit to monitor
the entrepreneur’s project choice at an interim date. This information enables the
bank to liquidate the project, if the continuation payoff of the risky project (safe
project is never liquidated) does not guarantee her a sufficient continuation
payoff. Although liquidation is inefficient ex post, the bank may be able to impose
a credible threat of liquidating the risky project. This threat of liquidation may act
as a disciplinary device. If the project is not liquidated at date 2, it continues until
date 3, at which date the payoffs of the project are divided between financiers and
the entrepreneur.
In the above model, we examine how entrepreneurs, characterised by their
initial wealth and the liquidation value of their projects, choose the firm’s capital
structure. The entrepreneur can choose between uninformed finance, bank
finance, or a mixture of both (mixed finance). We examine the feasibility of
different types of finance and characterise the conditions under which a
combination of a bank loan and an equity investment by the bank is the only
feasible financing mix for an entrepreneur.
In our model, the feasibility of finance requires that the financing mix is such
that it induces the entrepreneur to invest in the safe project instead of investing in
the risky project or diverting the funds and that the financiers are guaranteed a
sufficient rate of return. More technically, the feasibility of finance requires that
financiers’ participation constraints and the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility
constraints (‘asset substitution constraint’ and ‘diversion constraint’) are satisfied.
                                                
1 In the absence of this assumption, there would be no role for debt as equity finance would
completely eliminate the asset substitution problem. The assumption of costly diversion is a simple
way to introduce debt into our model.9
We show that, sufficiently wealthy entrepreneurs receive cheap uninformed
finance, either in the form of bonds, equity, or a mixture of both. In contrast, firms
with lower wealth must rely on more expensive informed finance. Bank loans are
feasible for some entrepreneurs with low-wealth but high liquidation values for
whom the bank can impose a credible threat of liquidation. However, the
liquidation threat is not credible for some entrepreneurs with low liquidation
values, as the bank’s continuation return from letting the risky project continue is
higher than the liquidation value. This creates a role for mixed finance.
The role of mixed finance is that it allows a reduction in the funds contributed
by the bank and thus restores the credibility of the liquidation threat. This enables
some entrepreneurs, for whom uninformed finance and bank loans are
unavailable, to finance their projects with mixed finance. However, similarly as in
Repullo and Suarez (1998), mixed finance is not feasible for all entrepreneurs as
the bank and the investor can collude at the expense of uninformed investors.
More specifically, the entrepreneur can first invest in the inefficient risky project
and then bribe the bank not to liquidate the project by offering the bank a new
contract, to the detriment of uninformed financiers. Anticipating this, uninformed
financiers do not participate in the financing unless the initial contract between the
entrepreneur, the bank, and uninformed investors is renegotiation-proof. For some
entrepreneurs with low wealth and low liquidation values, there are no such
renegotiation-proof contracts.
To summarise the above discussion, there are some entrepreneurs with low
wealth and low liquidation values for whom neither uninformed finance, bank
loans nor mixed finance are feasible. Thus, there is a potential role for financing
these entrepreneurs with a combination of a bank loan and an equity investment
by the same bank. Our principal finding is that this mode of finance dominates
other forms of finance only under quite stringent conditions. The main implication
of this finding is that the social benefits of allowing banks to hold equity in their
borrowing firms seem rather small, at least in the case where equity is
characterised only by its cash flow rights.
The social benefits of banks’ equity holdings in their borrowing firms may be
small because of the following two disadvantages of banks’ equity stakes. First, in
general, equity finance may give rise to other moral hazard problems that are
absent or smaller under debt financing. In our model, banks’ equity holdings give
rise to the diversion moral hazard problem. Another problem of the bank’s equity
stake is that it reduces the credibility of the bank’s liquidation threat by increasing
the bank’s returns from letting the risky project continue. Mixed finance, in
contrast, enhances the credibility of bank’s liquidation threat. Therefore, mixed
finance may be feasible for many entrepreneurs for whom the mixture of bank
loans and bank’s equity investment is not feasible. Despite these disadvantages of
banks’ equity holdings, allowing banks to hold equity may be welfare increasing,10
if banks, as equityholders, are less vulnerable to the diversion moral hazard
problem than uninformed equityholders.
Besides John et al (1994), there are some other theoretical papers that
examine banks’ incentives to hold equity in their borrowing firms. James (1995)
and Berlin et al (1996) argue that a bank’s equity stake may facilitate more
effective bank interventions when firms are in financial distress. Sheard (1989)
and Flath (1993) suggest that by holding stock in the firms they lend, banks
acquire insider information facilitating their monitoring of the firms’ decisions.
2
Steinherr and Huveneers (1994), in turn, suggest that banks’ equity ownership
strengthens the long-run relationship between the bank and the borrower.
Unfortunately, they do not work out their idea in a fully specified model. In
Mahrt-Smith (2000), it is easier for a firm to acquire additional funds from outside
banks, if the informed inside bank holds both debt and equity. Yet another role for
banks’ equity ownership is provided by Boyd et al (1997) and Santos (1999), who
show that banks’ investments in equity alleviate the moral hazard problem caused
by deposit insurance. Finally, our model is largely based on Repullo and Suarez
(1998), which is a model of mixed finance. However, Repullo and Suarez (1998)
do not address the issue of the banks’ equity holding in borrowing firms, which is
our main interest.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the
model. In sections 3, 4, and 5, we examine the feasibility of uninformed finance,
bank finance, and mixed finance, respectively. In section 6, we collect the results




Consider a model with four dates (t = 0,1,2,3) and a continuum of risk-neutral
owner-managed firms (henceforth ‘entrepreneurs’ or ‘firms’) characterised by
their initial wealth w[0,1) and the liquidation value L[0,1) of their project. The
cost of the project is normalised at one, and the investment is made at date 1. To
carry out the investment project, the entrepreneur needs 1 – w outside funds from
informed or uninformed investors at date 0. The entrepreneur can invest either in
the socially efficient safe project or in the socially inefficient risky project.
                                                
2 Their view, however, is challenged by Berlin et al (1996, p. 890) who argue that large investors
acquire similar information whether or not their claim includes an equity component.11
Alternatively, the entrepreneur can simply divert or ‘steal’ the borrowed funds.
We assume that the diversion is costly for the entrepreneur. The returns of the safe
and the risky project and the costs of diversion will be specified below.
If the entrepreneur invests in the safe or in the risky project, the assets
purchased can be liquidated by creditors at date 2. Since L < 1, the liquidation is
always inefficient. Note that the firm-specific liquidation value is the same for the
safe and the risky project. At date 3, the liquidation values depreciate to zero. If
the project is not liquidated at date 2, it yields monetary returns at date 3. The safe
project yields a return S > 1 with certainty. Risky projects yield a good return G
with probability 1/2 < p < 1 and a bad return 0 with probability 1 – p. For project
returns it holds that G  >  S  >  1  >  pG, implying that risky projects are socially
inefficient.
The following time line displays the sequence of events.








Following Rajan (1992) and Repullo and Suarez (1998), for example, we
differentiate between informed (bank) finance and uninformed (market) finance.
Banks differ from uninformed investors in that at date 2 they can learn the firm’s
choice between the safe and the risky project at a cost c. We assume that c is
sufficiently small, c  <  S  –  1. On the basis of this information acquired by
monitoring, the bank can either liquidate the firm’s assets or let the project
continue. To avoid the issues related to endogenous monitoring, we assume that
the bank can commit to use the monitoring technology. We further assume that the
information acquired by monitoring is not verifiable. Because of unverifiability of
information, financial contracts cannot be conditional on the choice of project.
In contrast to banks, uninformed investors are unable to observe the project
choice. We regard uninformed investors as small investors, who either lack the
ability to monitor or have no incentives to monitor because of free-rider problems.
The markets for both bank finance and uninformed finance are assumed to be
competitive.12
C. Contracts
We allow two types of contracts: debt and equity. The contract between the
entrepreneur and the financier is signed at date 0, and it defines the size of the
financier’s investment, and her share of the success returns if the project is not
liquidated.
The debt contract between the entrepreneur and the type f financier f{i, u},
where i denotes the bank (informed investor) and u denotes the uninformed
investor, is denoted by a pair (If,d, Df). If,d denotes the size of the debt provided by
a type f financier, and Df is her required debt repayment.
We assume that debtholders have a right to force the firm to repay the loan
early if demanded. We can assume, for example, that debtholders can demand an
early repayment of the debt under ‘materially adverse circumstances’ (see eg
Brealey and Myers 1996, p. 692–693). In our model, the materially adverse
circumstances correspond to the entrepreneur investing in the risky project. Note
that the right to call the debt right is worthless for the uninformed financier as she
does not observe the entrepreneur’s project choice. In contrast, the right to
liquidate is valuable for the bank. Although the liquidation is inefficient from the
social point of view, we show that the bank can in some circumstances use the
liquidation threat as a disciplinary device that induces the entrepreneur to invest in
the socially efficient safe project.
We further assume that the bank debt is senior. Thus, in the event of default
the bank is paid before other financiers. It seems that seniority is a typical
characteristic of bank debt contracts (see eg Gorton and Kahn 1993). Furthermore,
in their moral hazard setup Repullo and Suarez (1998) show that the seniority of
informed (bank) debt is a feature of optimal security design.
The standard limited liability assumption implies that in case the project is not
liquidated, the type f financier’s profit from a debt contract (If,d, Df) is
 d , f f f I D , x ~ R   , where x ~  = S, G or 0.
Equity contracts are characterized by a pair (If,e, f). The variable If,e denotes
the size of the equity investment made by a type f investor. The variable f
denotes the type f investor’s share of the firm profit (of which debt repayments
have been deducted). We assume that at most one type of financiers holds equity
in any firm. Thus, if a firm raises funds by issuing equity, then equity is held
either by the bank or by uninformed investors but not by both. We can show that
this assumption implies no loss of generality. Given this assumption, the type f
equityholder’s return from an equity contract (If,e, f) for a return realisation x ~
and for given realised total debt repayments RT is simply  ) R x ~ ( T f   . Note that
we treat outside equity merely as a claim to the future cash flows of the project.
Thus, we assume that outside equityholders have no control rights in the firm. We,13
in effect, assume that the firm is controlled by the entrepreneur, who simply
controls the board, and thus is able to make decisions that serve his own interests.
As explained above, debt and equity differ by their cash flow and liquidation
rights. We assume that there is an additional difference between debt and equity:
Debt is better than equity in protecting financiers from direct expropriation by the
entrepreneur. This difference is discussed next.
D. Diversion of funds
The large ‘agency cost’ literature, initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), shows
how the separation of ownership and control can induce self-interested managers
to waste investors’ funds. In our model, the entrepreneur can waste investors’
funds in two ways. First, as discussed above, he can invest in the socially
inefficient risky project. Second, to be discussed in this subsection, he can simply
divert or steal the funds provided by the financier.
3 Of course, in reality the
expropriation may take more subtle forms. For example, the entrepreneur can
transfer firm resources in the form of salary or invest in the managerial perquisites
as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). For simplicity, however, we follow Boyd et al
(1998) by assuming that the entrepreneur can directly divert funds from financiers
to himself. In case of diversion, the invested funds yield financiers no profit and
no liquidation value (the entrepreneur takes the money and run).
Following Burkart et al (1998) and La Porta et al (2002), we assume that the
diversion is costly. The costs of diversion include, among other things, the costs
of legal or illegal maneuvering to divert profits and the costs of taking the risks of
legal challenges. Because of the costs of diversion, the entrepreneur’s profit from
diverting an investment If,s, is only
s , f s , f
E I ) k 1 (    (2.1)
In equation 1, kf,s denotes the cost-of-theft parameter (La Porta et al 2002). The
cost-of-theft parameter determines the profits of the entrepreneur who diverts the
investment If,s made by a type f investor in the form of type s security (debt or
equity). We make the following two key assumptions on the cost-of-theft
parameters.
                                                
3 In contrast to Hart (1995, ch. 5) and La Porta et al (2002), for example, we assume that the
entrepreneur cannot steal the final cash flows.14
Assumption 1.  1 k k d , u d , i   .
Assumption 2.  1 k k 0 e , i e , u    .
These two assumptions present two important ideas. First, in many countries, it
seems to be more difficult for entrepreneurs to expropriate debtholders than
equityholders. Debtholders’ rights are almost universally more clearly defined
than equityholders’ rights, which makes it easier for courts to verify the violation
of the debt contract (La Porta et al 1998). In particular, debt contracts commonly
contain a wide range of covenants requiring the borrower to take or refrain from
various actions. If covenants are violated, debtholders receive certain well-defined
rights, such as the right to repossess collateral or the right to force the firm into
the bankruptcy. As documented by La Porta et al (1998), in most countries the
legal rules and the enforcement of these rules favour debtholders. Our
assumptions 1 and 2 express the idea that debt contracts generally protect
financiers against the managerial expropriation better than equity contracts. More
specifically, assumption 1 implies that the entrepreneur’s profit from diverting
funds raised by debt is zero, while the profit from expropriating funds raised by
equity is positive by assumption 2.
The second idea, formalised in assumption 2, is that the diverting an equity
investment made by a bank is at least as costly as diverting the equity investment
made by an uninformed investor. This assumption can be defended by several
arguments. First, uninformed investors are often too small and too poorly
informed to exercise even the control rights they actually have (Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). Moreover, the free-rider problem may reduce their incentives to
acquire information about the firms. Second, banks may have a large degree of
monopoly power (say, because of their informational advantage) over any future
credit extended to the firm. This monopoly power may reduce the entrepreneur’s
incentives to expropriate the bank’s equity investment. Third, even in the absence
of legal protection against expropriation, banks may be able to impose, using the
terminology of Diamond (1984), stricter nonpecuniary penalties (ie the loss of
reputation) than small equityholders against the dishonest firms.
Although our formulation of the firm’s expropriation possibilities is clearly
simplistic, we believe that assumptions 1 and 2 capture two important insights.
First, legal systems generally protect debtholders better than equityholders and,
second, large informed equityholders (such as banks) may be able to reduce the
expropriation at least as effectively as small uninformed investors. Moreover, the
assumption that the entrepreneur’s returns from expropriating debtholders is zero
(assumption 1) allows us to create a clear trade-off between debt and equity.
Namely, as will be shown below, equity is superior to debt in alleviating the
standard project choice moral hazard (the choice between the safe and risky15
project), whereas debt is superior to equity in alleviating the expropriation moral
hazard problem (the choice between stealing and the safe project).
E. Information
Here we collect our assumptions on information. Everyone knows the
entrepreneur’s initial wealth w and the liquidation value L at date 0. Informed
investors observe the entrepreneur’s date 1 choice between the safe and the risky
project at a cost c at date 2. However, that choice is unobservable for uninformed
investors, and unverifiable for courts. Finally, date 3 returns are observable and
verifiable.
2.2 First-best equilibrium and feasible contracts
The first-best equilibrium is particularly easy to define. According to our
assumptions, liquidation, diversion of funds and investing in the risky project are
all socially inefficient. Thus, in the first-best equilibrium all firms, irrespective of
their initial wealth and the liquidation value of their projects, should receive
finance and invest in the safe project. However, as will be shown below,
asymmetric information and the imperfect legal protection against the managerial
expropriation render the first-best contracts unfeasible for some low-wealth, low-
liquidity value firms.
As the first-best choice of the safe project is not contractible, financiers must
induce the entrepreneur to choose the safe project voluntarily. In other words, the
equilibrium capital structure must be incentive compatible. In what follows, we
define the feasible capital structure as a combination of debt and equity contracts
that induces the entrepreneur to choose the safe project instead of the risky project
or instead of diverting the funds, and that, at the same time, satisfies all parties’
participation constraints.
In sections 3–5, we examine the feasibility of uninformed finance, bank
finance, and mixed finance, respectively. In section 6, we bring the results
together to examine the firm’s optimal capital structure.16
3 Uninformed finance
Uninformed finance is feasible only if the financial contract between the
entrepreneur and the uninformed investor induces the entrepreneur to choose the
safe project while satisfying the investor’s participation constraint.
Formally, the feasible contract must satisfy three constraints. First, the
entrepreneur must prefer the safe project to the risky project (‘asset substitution
incentive compatibility constraint’). Second, the entrepreneur must prefer the safe
project to diverting the invested funds (‘diversion incentive compatibility
constraint’). Third, contracts must yield the investor at least zero profits
(investor’s participation constraint).
We analyse three types of uninformed capital structures. In section 3.1, we
examine the case when the firm is financed only with uninformed debt. In section
3.2, we examine the case of pure uninformed equity finance. In section 3.3, we
study the case of mixed uninformed finance, when uninformed finance consists of
both debt and equity.
3.1 Uninformed debt
By assumption 1, the entrepreneur’s profits of diverting the funds raised by
uninformed debt is zero. Thus, when defining the feasible contract under
uninformed debt finance, we can ignore the diversion incentive compatibility
constraint.
Given this observation, uninformed debt is feasible only if the required debt
repayment Du is set so as to satisfy the asset substitution constraint and the
participation constraint of the uninformed financier.
w ) D G ( p w D S u u      (3.1)
0 ) w 1 ( Du    (3.2)
The asset substitutution incentive compatibility constraint (3.1) requires that the
entrepreneur’s profits from investing in the safe project must be higher than those
of investing in the risky project. The uninformed investor’s participation
constraint (3.2) requires that she must earn non-negative profits.
The assumption of competitive financial markets allows us to set (3.2) as
equality. Solving Du from the binding participation constraint (3.2) and inserting it
into (3.1) yields the following result.17
Lemma 1.  Any entrepreneur with w   wu,d > 0,  where  wu,d = [p(G – 1) –
 S + 1]/(1 – p),  receives  uninformed  debt  with  Iu,d = Du = 1 – w.  For
entrepreneurs with 0  w < wu,d, uninformed debt is not feasible.
We rule out the uninteresting case that all entrepreneurs receive uninformed debt
by assuming that parameters p, G, and S are such that 0 < wu,d < 1.
Lemma 1 states that only sufficiently wealthy entrepreneurs receive
uninformed debt. Uninformed debt is not feasible for some low-wealth
entrepreneur, as high leverage would induce them to invest in the risky project.
This is the standard asset substitution moral hazard problem of debt financing.
3.2 Uninformed equity
In this section we derive feasible uninformed equity contracts in a situation where
all the needed outside finance consists of uninformed equity, that is, when
Iu,e = 1 – w.
The problem of deriving the feasible uninformed equity contracts is simplified
by the following elementary observation. By assumption, S > pG. This implies
that (1 – u)S > (1 – u)pG for all u, 0 < u  1. Thus, under equity finance, the
entrepreneur’s payoff from investing in the safe project is always higher than his
expected payoff from investing in the risky project. In other words, there is no
asset substitution problem when the firm is financed with equity. This observation
allows us to ignore the asset substitution incentive compatibility constraint when
deriving the feasible equity contract.
However, equity finance gives rise to another moral hazard problem, which
was absent under debt finance. Namely, by equation (2.1) and assumption (2),
some low-wealth firms rather divert the funds raised by equity than invest them in
the safe project.
Now, uninformed equity is feasible only if
   ) w 1 )( k 1 ( w S ) 1 ( e , u u       , (3.3)
, 0 ) w 1 ( S u     (3.4)
where (3.3) is the entrepreneur’s diversion incentive compatibility constraint and
(3.4) the participation constraint of the equityholder. The incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied if the entrepreneur’s profits from investing in the safe
project exceed the profits from diverting the funds. According to the participation
constraint, the returns from equity must cover the equityholder’s initial equity
investment.18
We derive the feasible equity contracts similarly as above. In competitive
markets, the investor’s participation constraint (3.4) binds. Solving u from the
binding constraint (3.4) and inserting it into (3.3) yields the following result.
Lemma 2. Any entrepreneur with w  wu,e > 0, where wu,e = 1 – (S – 1)/(1 – ku,e),
receives uninformed equity with Iu,e = 1 – w, u = (1 – w)/S.  For  entrepreneurs
with 0  w < wu,e, uninformed equity is not feasible.
We concentrate only in the interesting case, where parameters S and ku,e are such
that 0 < wu,e < 1.
Similarly as with uninformed debt finance, some low-wealth entrepreneurs
are denied funding under uninformed equity finance. However, now the reason is
different. Under uninformed debt finance, the asset substitution moral hazard
prevents outside financing. Under uninformed equity finance, it is the diversion
moral hazard problem that renders uninformed equity unfeasible.
The feature of our model that equity finance resolves the asset substitution
moral hazard problem whereas debt finance resolves the diversion moral hazard
problem provides a prima facie case for mixed uninformed finance. One could
expect that some low-wealth entrepreneurs for whom the pure forms of
uninformed finance are not feasible could finance their investments with mixed
uninformed finance. That possibility is analysed next.
3.3 Mixed uninformed finance
Under mixed uninformed finance, the entrepreneur finances his investment with a
combination of uninformed debt and uninformed equity. Thus, the sum of the
funds raised by uninformed debt and uninformed equity, Iu,d + Iu,e, equals the total
needed outside finance, 1 – w.
Denote the required debt repayment under uninformed mixed finance by Du,m
and the uninformed investor’s share of the profit by u,m. Under uninformed
mixed finance, the feasible contract must satisfy the following three constraints:
w ) D G ( p ) 1 ( w ) D S )( 1 ( m , u m , u m , u m , u          , (3.5)
e , u e , u m , u m , u I ) k 1 ( w ) D S )( 1 (       , (3.6)
0 ) w 1 ( ) D S ( D m , u m , u m , u       , (3.7)19
where (3.5) is the asset substitution incentive compatibility constraint, (3.6) is the
diversion incentive compatibility constraint and (3.7) is the uninformed investor’s
participation constraint.
As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, any entrepreneur with wealth
w  min[wu,d, wu,e] can receive either uninformed debt finance or uninformed
equity finance. Therefore, we focus, in particular, on entrepreneurs for whom
these pure forms of uninformed finance are not feasible, that is, for whom
w < min[wu,d, wu,e].
Proposition 1. The following family of mixed uninformed contracts is feasible for
any entrepreneur with wealth w   wu,m, where wu,m = wu,d + wu,e – 1 > 0:
0 < Iu,d  1 – wu,d, 0  <  Iu,e 1 – wu,e, such that Iu,d + Iu,e = 1 – w;  Du,m = Iu,d and
u,m = (1 – w – Du,m)/(S – Du,m).
Proof: Start by simplifying the incentive compatibility constraints (3.5) and (3.6).
First, (3.5) reduces to S – Du,m  p(G – Du,m). Second, setting (3.7) as an equality,
solving for u,m and inserting u,m = (1 – w – Du,m)/(S – Du,m) into (3.6) reduces
(3.6) to S – 1  (1 – ku,e)Iu,e. Thus, the feasibility constraints (3.5)–(3.7) reduce to
the following two constraints.
) D G ( p D S m , u m , u    (3.5’)
e , u e , u I ) k 1 ( 1 S    . (3.6’)
Notice a special feature of the constraints (3.5’) and (3.6’). The asset substitution
incentive compatibility constraint (3.5’) is independent of the size of the equity,
and the diversion incentive compatibility constraint (3.6’) is independent of the
size of the debt. Thus, Du,m can be set to a level at which (3.5’) binds without
affecting the constraint (3.6’). Similarly, Iu,e can be set to a level at which (3.6’)
binds without affecting the constraint (3.5’). For the least wealthy entrepreneur
who receives uninformed mixed finance, both (3.5’) and (3.6’) must be binding.
By Lemma 1, condition (3.5’) binds when w = wu,d. This implies that for any
entrepreneur the maximum size of the debt is 1 – wu,d. By (3.3) and (3.4), (3.6’)
binds when w  =  wu,e. Thus, for any entrepreneur the maximum size of the
uninformed equity investment is 1  –  wu,e. The least wealthy entrepreneur who
receives uninformed finance raises the maximum amounts of both debt and
equity. Thus, the critical entrepreneurial wealth required for financing under
mixed uninformed finance is determined by 1  –  w  =  (1  –  wu,d) + (1 – wu,e).
Solving for w yields wu,m = wu,d + wu,e – 1. Thus, an entrepreneur with w  wu,m
can raise any combination of debt and equity such that Iu,d  1 – wu,d,
Iu,e  1 – wu,e, and such that the total amount raised Iu,d + Iu,e is equal to the needed20
finance 1 – w. Finally, because of competition in financial markets, Du,m and u,m
can be set at their competitive levels, Du,m = Iu,d = 1 – wu,d and
u,m = (1 – w – Du,m)/(S – Du,m). QED
Similarly as with uninformed debt finance and with uninformed equity finance,
we concentrate on the interesting case that mixed finance is feasible for some
entrepreneurs and infeasible for others by assuming that the parameters of the
model are such that 0 < wu,m < 1.
The following corollary follows directly from the definition of wu,m and from
the assumption that 0 < wu,d, wu,e < 1.
Corollary 1. The minimum entrepreneurial wealth required for financing under
mixed uninformed finance, wu,m, is lower than that under uninformed debt
finance, wu,d, or under uninformed equity finance, wu,e.
This result is a simple consequence of the ‘dichotomised” nature of our model,
conveyed in conditions (3.5’) and (3.6’). The maximum amount of debt that any
entrepreneur can raise is determined solely by (3.5’). Similarly, the maximum
amount of equity is determined solely by (3.6’) whereas (3.5’) is independent of
equity. Because of this dichotomisation, allowing for mixed uninformed finance
enables the entrepreneur to supplement his initial financing (debt or equity) from a
new source of finance while not affecting his ability to raise finance from the
initial source.
4 Bank finance
In this section we introduce an alternative source of finance, bank finance. Bank
finance differs from uninformed finance in two ways. First, banks learn with a
cost c the entrepreneur’s choice between the safe and the risky project. Second, by
assumption 2, it may be more difficult for entrepreneurs to divert the equity
investment made by a bank than that made by uninformed equityholders. In this
section we examine how these two differences affect the terms and feasibility of
bank finance compared with the terms and feasibility of uninformed finance.
We assume that the monitoring technology is similar to that in Repullo and
Suarez (1998). By paying a monitoring cost c, the bank learns the entrepreneur’s
project choice. The information acquired through monitoring, however, is
unverifiable to the court. Therefore, the contract between the bank and the
entrepreneur cannot be contingent on monitoring. However, we assume that the
bank can use the information acquired by monitoring when deciding between the
liquidation and continuation of the project at date 2. Namely, we assume that the21
bank has a right to ‘call’ the debt, that is, a right to demand the entrepreneur to
repay the loan before the final maturity date. Furthermore, to avoid the difficulties
involved in endogenising the monitoring decision, we assume that the bank can
contractually commit to monitor. In addition, we rule out stochastic monitoring.
In our model, the liquidation has a disciplinary role. We show that under
certain circumstances the bank can impose a credible threat of liquidation. The
credible threat of liquidation induces the entrepreneur, who would otherwise
choose the risky project, to choose the safe project instead. Importantly, we show
(in section 6) that some low-wealth entrepreneurs, who are denied uninformed
finance, receive bank finance because of the discipline involved in it.
We examine two types of bank finance. In section 4.1, we examine a situation
when the firm is financed only with a bank loan, and in section 4.2 the situation
when the bank finances the firm with a combination of debt and equity.
4.1 Bank loans
In this section we assume that all the borrowed funds are in the form a bank loan:
Ii,d  =  1  –  w. When deriving the feasible bank loan contracts, we can, by
assumption 1, ignore the diversion moral hazard constraint. Let us start solving
the feasible bank loan contracts by dividing entrepreneurs into two categories:
(i)  those who would invest in the safe project even in the absence of the
liquidation threat, and (ii) those who would invest in the safe project only in the
presence of the (credible) liquidation threat.
For the first group of entrepreneurs, the feasibility conditions are similar to
those under uninformed debt finance (conditions 3.1 and 3.2) except that the
bank’s participation constraint (4.2) includes the monitoring cost c.
w ) D G ( p w D S i i      , (4.1)
0 ) c w 1 ( Di     , (4.2)
where Di denotes the required debt repayment of the bank loan. Setting (4.2) as
equality, and inserting Di into (4.1) yields the following result.
Lemma 3. Under bank lending, the minimum entrepreneurial wealth that induces
the entrepreneur to invest in the safe project regardless of the liquidation value of
the firm’s assets is  c w w d u, d i,   .22
Thus, the entrepreneurs characterised in Lemma 3, if financed by bank loans,
would invest in the safe project even in the absence of the liquidation threat
involved in bank finance.
Now, consider the other group of entrepreneurs, that is, the entrepreneurs with
d , i w w  . These entrepreneurs invest in the safe project at date 1 only if the bank
can credibly threaten to liquidate risky project at date 2. We show that the bank
can impose a credible threat of liquidation for some of these low-wealth
entrepreneurs, if the liquidation value of the entrepreneur’s project is high enough
with respect to the entrepreneur’s wealth.
The bank loan is feasible for any firm with  d , i w w   if and only if the
liquidation of the risky project is a subgame perfect decision for the bank at date
2. The subgame perfectness requires that the bank’s return from the liquidation is
at least as high as the expected return from letting the risky project continue.
Thus, the liquidation threat is credible if and only if L  pDi. Insert Di = 1 – w + c
from the binding participation constraint (4.2) of the bank into this inequality and
solve for L. It follows that the liquidation threat is credible, if
) c w 1 ( p L    . (4.3)
Setting this as equality and solving for w yields the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Under bank lending, the minimum entrepreneurial wealth required for
the bank’s liquidation threat to be credible is the following function of the
liquidation value of the firm’s assets: wi,d(L) = 1 + c – (L/p).
Thus, the bank can impose a credible threat of liquidation for entrepreneurs with
w  wi,d(L). On the other hand, the bank’s threat to liquidate the assets of
entrepreneurs with w < wi,d(L) is not credible ex-post. Thus, these entrepreneurs,
if financed by the bank, would invest in the risky project. Anticipating this, the
bank refuses to lend to these entrepreneurs.
The next proposition combines the results of lemmas 3 and 4.
Proposition 2.  Bank loans are feasible for any entrepreneur with
  (L) w , w min w d i, d i,   with terms Ii,d = 1 – w and Di = 1 – w + c. Bank loans are
not feasible for entrepreneurs with    (L) w , w min w d i, d i,  .
Figure 1 shows how the curves  d , i w  and wi,d(L) divide the (w, L)-space into two
non-overlapping regions. Bank loans are feasible for all entrepreneurs in the upper
region,    ) L ( w , w min w d , i d , i  , and infeasible for all entrepreneurs in the lower
region,    ) L ( w , w min w d , i d , i  .23
Figure 1. Feasibility of bank loans
This figure shows the region in the (liquidation value,
wealth)-space, where bank loans are feasible
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4.2 Bank’s equity stake in the borrowing firm
In this section we begin addressing the principal problem of our paper: What are
banks’ incentives to hold equity stakes in their borrowing firms?
Suppose that the firm is financed with a mix of a bank loan and an equity
investment by the bank such that Ii,d + Ii,e = 1 – w. For shorthand, we denote this
type of finance by mixed bank finance. Denote the required debt repayment and
the required share of the final profits under mixed bank finance by Di,m and i,m,
respectively. Since, by proposition 2, entrepreneurs with    ) L ( w , w min w d , i d , i 
receive bank loans, we focus in this section on entrepreneurs with
  ) L ( w , w min w d , i d , i  .
Mixed bank finance is feasible for a firm characterised by a pair (w, L) if the
debt and equity contracts (Ii,d, Di,m) and (Ii,e, i,m) satisfy the following conditions.
 ) D G ( D p L
w ) D G ( p ) 1 ( w ) D S )( 1 (
m , i m , i m , i
m , i m , i m , i m , i
    
        
(4.4)
e , i e , i m , i m , i I ) k 1 ( w ) D S )( 1 (       (4.5)24
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Condition (4.4) is the asset substitution incentive compatibility constraint. As
discussed in the previous section, this constraint is satisfied if at least one of the
following two conditions is satisfied: (i) the entrepreneur invests in the safe
project even in the absence of the liquidation threat, (ii) the entrepreneur invests in
the safe project only if the liquidation threat is credible. The presence of equity in
the firm’s capital structure implies that we must also take the diversion incentive
compatibility constraint (4.5) into account. Inequality (4.6) is the informed
investor’s participation constraint.
The next proposition shows that mixed bank finance is feasible for some
entrepreneurs for whom bank loans are not feasible.
Proposition 3.  For any entrepreneur with    (L) w , w min w w d i, d i, m i,   , where
1 w w w e i, d i, m i,     and  0 ) k c)/(1 1 (S w e i, e i,      , bank loans are not feasible
but the following family of mixed bank finance contracts is feasible:
d i, d i, w 1 I 0     and  e i, e i, w 1 I 0    , such that  w 1 I I e i, d i,    ;  c I D d i, m i,   ,
) D )/(S D c w (1 α m i, m i, m i,      .
Proof: See Appendix.
We ignore the uninteresting case that all entrepreneurs would receive mixed bank
finance by assuming that the parameters of the model are such that  1 w 0 m , i   .
Figure 2 depicts the shaded region in the (w, L) space where mixed bank
finance is feasible and bank loans are not feasible. Mixed bank finance enables
entrepreneurs to supplement their bank loans by an equity investment from the
bank. The maximum size of the bank loan that the entrepreneur can raise is
determined solely by the project choice incentive compatibility constraint (4.1),
which is independent of the amount of outside equity. Thus, the low-wealth
entrepreneurs in the shaded region who cannot raise enough outside funds by bank
loans only, are able to finance their investments with a mixture of bank loan and
an equity investment by the bank.
Note, however, that a disadvantage of the bank’s equity stake is that it
weakens the credibility of the liquidation threat, as the bank’s equity stake in its
borrowing firm increases the bank’s expected continuation return from letting the
risky project continue (see the proof of Proposition 3 for details). This result can
also be seen from Figure 2. In figure 2, the line wi,m(L) which depicts the
minimum required wealth level required for the bank’s liquidation threat to be
credible under mixed bank finance, is situated to the right of the wi,d(L), which is
the corresponding line under bank lending.25
Figure 2. Region where informed bank finance is feasible
but where bank loans are not feasible
By proposition 3, in the shaded region, mixed bank
finance is feasible whereas bank loans are not feasible.
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5 Mixed finance
In previous sections we examined the feasibility of different capital structures
under the assumption, that entrepreneurs are funded exclusively by the bank or,
alternatively, by uninformed investors. In this section we examine the possibility
that entrepreneurs may in some circumstances prefer a combination of bank
finance and uninformed finance to other forms of finance. We derive the feasible
three-party contracts between the entrepreneur, the bank and the uninformed
investor, and show that such three-party contracts can indeed improve the
feasibility of the two-party contracts for some entrepreneurs.
Without loss of generality, in this section we concentrate on the case where
the entrepreneur is financed with a combination of a bank loan and uninformed
debt (such as bonds)
4. In what follows, we denote the combination of a bank loan
and uninformed debt simply as mixed finance to differentiate it from mixed bank
finance and mixed uninformed finance.
As will be shown below, the benefit of mixed finance is that it improves the
credibility of the liquidation threat by reducing the bank’s share of the provided
funds.  As we showed in section 4.1, the bank’s liquidation threat is not credible
for some entrepreneurs since the liquidation value L of the investment project is
                                                
4 We can show that no entrepreneur strictly prefers any other mode of mixed finance.26
low compared to the funds 1 – w + c contributed by the bank. In this section we
show that the introduction of a passive uninformed lender allows some
entrepreneurs with low liquidity values to receive mixed finance by enabling the
reduction of funds contributed by the bank.
The presence of an uninformed third party complicates the derivation of
feasible contracts by introducing the possibility of renegotiation between the
entrepreneur and the bank at the expense of the uninformed lender. By
renegotiation we refer to the possibility that the entrepreneur, after investing in the
risky project at date 1, attempts to bribe the bank not to liquidate the project by
offering it a new contract that changes the promised debt repayment from Di,M to
M , i D . The uninformed lender does not take part in the renegotiation because of
her inability to observe the project choice. Moreover, as discussed by Repullo and
Suarez (1998), the non-contractibility of the project choice precludes the use of
any mechanism that would truthfully reveal this information to the uninformed
lender.
As investing in the risky project is always inefficient, the uninformed lender
accepts the three-party contract only if it is renegotiation-proof. Mixed finance
contracts are renegotiation-proof in two cases. First, they are renegotiation-proof
if the bank’s maximum expected payoff under continuation is smaller than it
would get upon liquidation, that is, if [L, Di,M]  p(G – Du,M).
The initial contract is also renegotiation-proof if the renegotiated contract is
so expensive for the entrepreneur that he rather invests in the safe project. Let us
consider this possibility. In the renegotiation game, the status quo payoffs of the
entrepreneur and the bank are p(G  –  Di,M – Du,M) and pDi,M, respectively. In
addition, the value of the bank’s outside option is the liquidation value
min[L, Di,M] of the project. Now, assume that the entrepreneur has chosen the
risky project at date 1 and proposes the bank a new contract at date 2. By the
outside option principle
5, the new contract is given by
 
 . otherwise , p / D , L min
, D , L min pD if , D D
M , i
M , i M , i M , i M , i   
(5.1)
Thus, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from investing in the risky project is
) D D G ( p M , i M , u    , where  M , i D  is defined in (5.1).
                                                
5 Roughly speaking, the outside option principle states that the outside option (the option to quit
the negotiations and liquidate the project) affects the bank´s equilibrium payoff only if the value of
the outside option is higher than his equilibrium payoff in a game with no outside option (the
status quo payoff). In that case his equilibrium payoff in the renegotiation game must be equal to
the value of the outside option. For a more detailed exposition of the outside option principle, see
Repullo and Suarez (1998), Sutton (1986) or Osborne and Rubistein (1990).27
Now, the feasibility conditions of mixed finance are the following. Mixed
finance, characterised by contracts (Ii,d, Di,M) and (Iu,d, Du,M), is feasible if the
following conditions hold.
  ) D G ( p D , L min ) D D G ( p D D S M , u M , i M , i M , u M , i M , u          (5.2)
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The next proposition characterises the feasible contracts under mixed finance.
Proposition 4.  Any entrepreneur with w   wM(L), where  L w (L) w d b, M   ,
receives mixed finance with terms Ii,d = L – c,  Di,M = L,  Iu,M = 1 – w – L + c.
Mixed finance is not feasible for entrepreneurs with w < wM(L).
Proof: See the Appendix.
We explain the Proposition 4 as follows. To receive mixed finance, the
entrepreneur designs the mixed finance contract so that (i) the bank has the right
incentives to liquidate, and, related to the first objective, so that (ii) the bank and
the entrepreneur have no incentives to collude. The bank has right incentives to
liquidate when the size of the loan is sufficiently low to make the liquidation
threat credible. That is, for a given L, the size of the bank loan Ii,d should be
sufficiently low so as to satisfy L  pDi,M. On the other hand, the size of the bank
loan should be as high as possible to reduce the incentives of the bank and the
entrepreneur to collude and renegotiate the initial contract. The conflict between
these two objectives is lowest when the bank’s required debt repayment Di,M is set
so that the constraint L  pDi,M is binding. Setting this as equality and assuming
competitive markets yields the result the highest feasible size of the bank loan is
L – c. As the entrepreneur needs 1 – w outside finance, the size of the uninformed
debt is 1 – w – L + c. In addition, competition in financial markets guarantees that
the debt repayments Db,M and Du,M are as defined in Proposition 4.
According to Proposition 4, the higher is the liquidation value of the firm the
lower is the minimum entrepreneurial wealth required for financing under mixed
finance. The reason is the following. As discussed above, the maximum size of
the bank loan under mixed finance is determined by the liquidation value of the
firm’s assets. The higher the liquidation value of the firm the larger share of the
needed outside finance 1 – w can be in the form of bank loan (L – c), and the
lower share need to raised in the form of uninformed debt (1 – w – L + c). The
bigger the bank loan the more costly it is for the entrepreneur to collude with the
bank and to renegotiate the terms of the initial contract. If the liquidation value is
sufficiently high with respect to the needed outside finance, the entrepreneur28
never chooses the risky project as he anticipates that the renegotiation with the
bank is too costly. Conversely, suppose that the liquidation value of the assets is
low relative to the needed outside finance. Then, only a small share of the needed
funds could be raised from the bank and the rest would have to be raised from the
uninformed financier. In that case, it is impossible for the entrepreneur to set the
terms of the initial contract in such a way that the bank loan is sufficiently small
to preserve the bank’s ex-post incentive to liquidate the risky project, and, at the
same time, sufficiently large to eliminate the entrepreneur’s and the bank’s ex-
post incentive to collude and renegotiate the initial contract. Anticipating that the
initial contract is not renegotiation-proof, the uninformed investor is not willing to
participate in the funding.
6 The choice between uninformed finance,
bank finance, and mixed finance
In this section we collect our results. Figure 3 summarises the results of the
previous sections by showing the regions in the (w,  L)-space where different
forms of finance are feasible. By Proposition 1, uninformed finance is feasible for
entrepreneurs with w   wu,m. By Proposition 2, bank loans are feasible for
entrepreneurs with    ) L ( w , w min w d , i d , i  . By Proposition 3, the mixture of a
bank loan and an equity investment by the bank is feasible while informed debt is
infeasible for entrepreneurs with    ) L ( w , w min w w d , i d , i m , i   . By Proposition 4,
mixed finance is feasible for entrepreneurs with  ) L ( w w M  .
Figure 3. Optimal modes of finance
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In drawing the figure 3, we have assumed that the critical wealth required for
financing under uninformed finance, wu,m, is higher than the corresponding critical
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Now, we are ready to present our two principal results.
Proposition 5. Provided that  c ) k , k ( e , u e , i   , then for any entrepreneur with
  ) L ( w , w min w w M m , u m , i    the only feasible mode of finance is a mixture of a
bank loan and an equity investment by the bank.
Proposition 6. For any entrepreneur with  m , i M w w ) L ( w   , the only feasible
mode of finance is mixed finance.
Proposition 5 characterises the conditions under which the only way for some
firms to receive finance is to let the informed financier (such as a bank) to hold
equity in its borrowing firm. For these firms, other modes of finance are not
feasible. Bank loans are not feasible because the bank cannot impose a credible
threat of liquidation, and mixed finance is not feasible because debt contracts with
multiple financiers are not renegotiation-proof. Uninformed finance, in turn, is not
feasible since the entrepreneur cannot raise enough uninformed equity (to
supplement uninformed debt) as uninformed equityholders are poorly protected
against managerial expropriation.
According to condition (6.1), informed bank finance dominates uninformed
finance for any entrepreneur only if the entrepreneur’s cost of diverting the bank’s
equity investment is sufficiently low compared to the cost of diverting uninformed
investors’ equity investment. One interpretation of this result is that, according to
our model, banks’ equityholding in their borrowing firms should be more
common in those countries where uninformed minority equityholders rights are
poorly protected against managerial expropriation. In countries where uninformed
minority shareholders are well protected, banks’ right to hold equity in their
borrowing firms provide little if any social benefits.
According to Proposition 6 and as illustrated in Figure 3, for some
entrepreneurs with very low wealth but with sufficiently high liquidation values
the only feasible mode of finance is mixed finance, more specifically, a
combination of a bank loan and uninformed debt. The benefit of mixed finance
compared to other modes of finance is that that the liquidation threat is as30
effective as possible under mixed finance. As a consequence, high liquidation
values allow some very low wealth entrepreneur to raise mixed finance, since the
credible liquidation threat induces them to invest in the safe project. Thus, our
model yields a testable prediction that especially those investments involving
nonspecific, highly liquid and tangible assets are most likely to be financed with
mixed finance. This result is close to that in Repullo and Suarez (1998). In
Repullo and Suarez (1998), however, firms with low wealth but with high
liquidation values always prefer informed finance to mixed finance. For those
firms in our model, mixed finance is the only feasible mode of finance.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine in a double moral hazard model the feasible capital
structures for firms characterised by their wealth and their liquidation value. Firms
can raise funds to finance their investment project from three different sources,
from the bank, from uninformed investors, or from both types of investors by
issuing two types of securities, debt or equity. Uninformed (market) finance is
cheaper than the bank finance, but banks are superior to uninformed investors in
reducing the entrepreneurial moral hazard because of their ability to monitor the
entrepreneur’s project choice, and because banks may be better protected against
managerial expropriation. Debt and equity are, following the tradition of Jensen
and Meckling (1976), characterised by their cash flow rights. The only exception
is that debtholders have, in addition to their cash flow rights, the right to liquidate
the investment project.
We characterise the conditions under which the only feasible mode of finance
for some firms consists of the mixture of a bank loan and an equity investment
made by the same bank. In our model, the bank’s equity stake in its borrowing
firm aligns the bank’s and the entrepreneur’s conflicting interests allowing some
firms, who otherwise would not receive finance, to invest in (efficient) projects.
The role of bank’s equity stake is similar to that in John et al (1994). However, in
their model, the bank is a passive substitute of the firm’s capital structure. We
show that banks may have incentives to hold equity also in our model, where the
differences between banks and uninformed investors are clearly specified, and
where the bank finance and uninformed (market) finance coexist. In addition, in
contrast to most other models of universal banking, our explanation of the benefits
of bank’s equity stakes is not control-related. In our model, the bank may have
incentives to hold equity in its borrowing firm even when outside equity is
characterised only by its cash flow rights. However, if the rights of the small,
uninformed equityholders are well-defined and well-protected, the social benefits
of banks’ equityholding are likely to be small or non-existent.31
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The idea of the proof can be seen from figure 2. In terms
of figure 2, mixed bank finance can potentially improve the feasibility of bank
loans in two ways. First, if the curve  m , i w , corresponding to the curve  d , i w  in the
case of bank loans, is located underneath  d , i w , and second, if the curve wi,m(L)
corresponding to the curve wi,d(L) in the case of bank loans is located to the left of
the wi,d(L)-curve. In this proof we that show mixed bank finance improves the
feasibility of bank loans because  m , i w  is indeed located underneath  d , i w . We also
show that wi,m(L)-curve is not located to the left of wi,d(L)-curve but to the right
instead.
Let us start by showing that the curve wi,m(L) is located to the right of
wi,d(L)-curve, defined in Lemma 4. By rewriting  ) D G ( m , i m , i    as
) S G ( ) D S ( m , i m , i m , i       and solving  ) D S ( m , i m , i    from the binding
participation constraint (4.6), we can reduce    ) D G ( D p L m , i m , i m , i      to
)) S G ( c w 1 ( p L m , i       . Setting this as an equality and solving for w yields
the critical wealth level for the liquidation threat to be credible under mixed bank
finance:  ) S G ( ) p / L ( c 1 ) L ( w m , i m , i       . Since the last term  ) S G ( m , i    is
positive, it follows that  ) L ( w ) L ( w d , i m , i  . This implies that the wi,m(L)-curve is
located to the right of the wi,d(L)-curve.
Now consider the inequality  w ) D S )( 1 ( m , i m , i    
w ) D G ( p ) 1 ( m , i m , i      . The derivation of the minimum entrepreneurial
wealth  m , i w  that satisfies this inequality and the derivations of the contract terms
Ii,d, Ii,e, Di,m and i,m follow the steps of the proof of Proposition 1. By following
those steps, we get  1 w w w e , i d , i m , i    . Since 0  <  wi,e  <  1, it follows that
d , i m , i w w  . Thus, in figure 2,  m , i w  is located below  d , i w .
The findings  d , i m , i w w   and  ) L ( w ) L ( w d , i m , i   reveal that, for entrepreneurs
with    ) L ( w , w min w w d , i d , i m , i   , mixed bank finance is feasible whereas bank
debt is not feasible. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us first show that the inequality
  ) D G ( p D , L min M , u M , i    is never satisfied in our model. This inequality holds
most likely when Di,M and Du,M are set in such a way that left-hand-side of the
above inequality is as large and the right-hand-side inequality as small as possible,
under the condition that Di,M + Du,M = 1 – w + c (from the binding participation
constraints and the financing requirement in (5.3)). It is easy to see that the above
inequality holds most likely when Di,m = L and Du,M = 1 – w + c – L. By inserting
these values into  m , i w , we get   ) c L w 1 ( G p L      . This condition is32
satisfied for all entrepreneurs with  ) p 1 /( ) c w 1 G ( p L      . This inequality
never holds, since 0  L < 1 and since the right-hand-side is always bigger than
one by assumptions 1/2 < p < 1 and c < G – 1.
Now, let us examine the constraint  ) D D G ( p D D S M , i M , u M , i M , u       .
Since the participation constraints in (5.3) bind, this reduces to
) D I G ( p ) c w 1 ( S M , i d , u        , where  M , i D  is given by (5.1). By (5.1),
M , i M , i D D   , if  L pD M , i   and    p / D , L min M , i  otherwise. Suppose first that
L pD M , i  , which implies that  M , i M , i D D   . In that case, (5.2) reduces to
)) c w 1 ( G ( p ) c w 1 ( S        . By Lemma 3, this holds for all entrepreneurs
with  d , i w w  .
Now, suppose that pDi,M < L. In that case, by (5.1),    p / D , L min D M , i M , i   . By
inserting this into (5.2) and using the fact that the participation constraints in (5.3)
bind, we obtain
  ) p / c I , L min I G ( p ) c w 1 ( S d , i d , u        (A5.2’)
Let us now derive the lowest value of w such that (A5.2’) is satisfied. For that
lowest feasible value of w, the right-hand-side of (A5.2’) must be as low as
possible. It is easy to see that for any given L, and given that Iu,d + Ii,d = 1 – w, the
right-hand-side of (A5.2’) reaches its lowest possible value when Ii,d = L – c and
Iu,d = 1 – w – L + c. Inserting these into (A5.2’) and solving for w yields the result
that (A5.2’) is satisfied for all entrepreneurs with  L w w d , i   . Finally, by
inserting Ii,d = L – c  and  Iu,d = 1 – w – L + c  into  the  binding  participation
constraints (5.3), we obtain the rest of the terms in the mixed finance contract in
Proposition 4, Di,M = L and Du,M = 1 – w – L + c. QED33
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